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ERISA—ON THE EDGE OF EQUITY: CAN “APPROPRIATE 
EQUITABLE RELIEF” BE CAPPED? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A hardworking union laborer goes to a local establishment to get a drink.1  
An intoxicated man pulls a knife and stabs him in the stomach.2  The resulting 
injuries cause nearly $40,000 in medical treatment, lost wages, and disability.3  
Because the attacker has been criminally prosecuted and has no assets, the only 
viable recovery is a dramshop action under state law, which would provide for 
compensation from the drinking establishment if it served the tortfeasor liquor 
to the point of intoxication.4 
Damages in dramshop actions are capped by state law at approximately 
$40,000 and can be difficult to prove.5  The man has only a few hundred 
dollars in out-of-pocket medical expenses that were not covered by his health 
insurance and, due to his pain and suffering, lost wages, and disability, he 
 
 1. This introduction is based on the federal case Trustees of the Carpenters’ Health and 
Welfare Trust Fund of St. Louis v. Brunkhorst, No. 05-382-DRH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38107 
(S.D. Ill. 2006). 
 2. Id. at *5 n.3. 
 3. Id. at *5, *7. 
 4. While a civil action could be brought against an incarcerated person with no assets, there 
is a low likelihood that any judgment would be collectible.  See Kauk v. Matthews, 426 N.E.2d 
552, 555 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (explaining that only after assets or income of a judgment debtor 
have been discovered may an Illinois court take action to execute and collect the judgment).  
Because the applicable statute of limitations on any potential civil action for assault and battery 
will likely expire prior to the termination of the incarceration period, it would be risky to file any 
civil action against the tortfeasor in this situation.  See Montague v. George J. London Mem’l 
Hosp., 396 N.E.2d 1289, 1293 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (stating that a two-year statute of limitations 
would govern a civil case for assault and battery in Illinois).  Because civil assault and battery 
cases are typically taken by attorneys on a contingency fee basis, there is no reasonable likelihood 
that an attorney would bring such an action against an incarcerated individual with no assets.  See 
STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 143–45 (7th ed. 
2005). 
 5. Liquor Control Act of 1934 § 6-21, 235 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/6-21 (2006).  See also 
ILLINOIS STATE COMPTROLLER, DRAM SHOP LIABILITY LIMITS (2009), available at 
http://www.ioc.state.il.us/ioc-pdf/Dram_Shop_Liability_2003_-_2009.pdf (presenting a yearly 
schedule of liability limits in dramshop actions calculated by the Comptroller of the State of 
Illinois pursuant to section 6-21(a) of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 in accordance with the 
consumer price index-u (CPI-U) during the preceding 12-month calendar year). 
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decides to hire an attorney who will proceed on the dramshop action for a 
contingency fee.  After discovery, it is revealed that the bartender on duty that 
night could not be found and other witnesses are either equivocal or were 
intoxicated, leaving the case difficult to prove.  The attorney, therefore, 
successfully negotiates a settlement for approximately half of the capped value 
of the lawsuit.6  Because of the limited amount of funds recovered, the attorney 
files a motion asking the state court to allocate the settlement.7  The court 
enters an order dividing the settlement in the following way: $9,151.31 for 
attorney’s fees and expenses; $6,282.90 to repay the health insurance 
company; $200 to pay an outstanding medical bill; and $5,365.79 to the 
injured party.8 
After the case is settled, a letter from the health insurance company arrives 
demanding reimbursement of the full settlement amount, pursuant to the terms 
of the health plan which is governed by the Employment Retirement Income 
Security Act [hereinafter “ERISA”].9  If the money is not paid, the insurance 
company threatens to stop paying the family’s health insurance benefits until 
the entire settlement amount is recovered.10  According to this letter, although 
the insurance company has received $6,292.90, the man would still owe 
$14,717.10, the remainder of his settlement that was previously distributed by 
the court.11  In the letter, insurance plan provision is quoted: 
As a condition of payment of any benefits to or on behalf of a Participant, and 
to the extent of such benefits paid, the Fund shall be subrogated to all rights of 
the Member against any individual, entity, organization or association for 
damages on account of the injury or illness for which the Fund paid such 
benefits. 
In the event that a Member shall recover any amount from a third party, by 
judgment, settlement or otherwise, for any act or omission causing an injury or 
illness for which the Fund paid benefits, then: 
a. The Member shall be obligated to immediately reimburse the Fund for 
the full amount of such benefits paid, up to the full amount of recovery 
undiminished by attorney’s fees or otherwise; and 
b. The Fund shall have a lien on the gross recovery prior to all other 
claims or liens including those for attorneys’ fees, in the amount 
necessary to satisfy the Fund’s rights of subrogation and 
reimbursement. 
 
 6. Brunkhorst, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38107, at *5–*6. 
 7. Id. at *6–*7. 
 8. Id. at *7. 
 9. Id. at *5–*7. 
 10. Id. at *7. 
 11. Brunkhorst, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38107, at *7. 
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In the event that a Member shall fail to reimburse the Fund for any of all 
amounts due under this provision, the Trustees shall be entitled, in their 
discretion, to suspend further payment of benefits to or for such Member 
(whether or not related to the same claim), and to apply benefits otherwise 
payable in satisfaction of the obligations of the member hereunder.12 
The injured man finds this provision unjust.13  He believes that he has been 
working, paying health insurance premiums, and receiving health insurance 
benefits as a condition of his employment.  He does not understand why it is 
fair for the health insurance company to take for itself the money he and his 
attorney worked to create for everyone’s benefit.  “Can they really keep the 
entire benefit and deprive others of their share?” he wonders.  Ultimately, the 
court is unsympathetic to his plight and finds that the ERISA plan is entitled to 
reimbursement of the the full amount of his settlement.14  The court even 
allows the ERISA plan to terminate any further health insurance benefits until 
the entire settlement amount is recouped.15  Although the court calls the 
remedy provided to the insurance company “appropriate equitable relief,” it 
makes no finding that the relief is appropriate and merely enforces the terms of 
the ERISA plan as written.16 
Employee benefit plans are a vital part of the compensation packages of 
many employees.17  ERISA was enacted in 1974 to protect important 
employment benefits, such as health insurance.18  In response to broad societal, 
demographic, and economic trends, “the designs, features and types of benefits 
provided by employer-sponsored plans have evolved” since Congress enacted 
ERISA over thirty years ago.19  Employers have responded to rising costs in 
health care “by replacing the traditional insured health care plan with health 
care plans” that are “self-insured” by the employer or managed care plans.20  
Although benefit plans have evolved to meet the changing needs of society, 
“ERISA’s core statutory provisions that regulate employee benefit plans and 
provide for enforcement remedies have remained remarkably consistent since 
its enactment.”21  As a result, the federal courts “have struggled to apply 
 
 12. Id. at *13–*14. 
 13. Id. at *13–*15. 
 14. Id. at *24–*26. 
 15. Id. at *25. 
 16. Brunkhorst, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38107, at *25. 
 17. Colleen E. Medill, Resolving the Judicial Paradox of “Equitable” Relief Under ERISA 
Section 502(a)(3), 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 827, 833 (2006). 
 18. Id. at 833–34. 
 19. Id. at 833. 
 20. Id. at 833–34. 
 21. Id. at 834. 
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ERISA’s original statutory language to situations arising in today’s” legal 
climate.22 
ERISA provides for actions to obtain “appropriate equitable relief.”23  This 
article discusses actions for appropriate equitable relief by ERISA benefit 
plans for subrogation and reimbursement in cases where there are statutorily 
limited or capped recoveries.  Part II provides a summary of ERISA and its 
purposes.  Part III includes a discussion of the purposes of subrogation and 
reimbursement in the context of ERISA.  Part IV discusses the Supreme 
Court’s evolving interpretation of the civil enforcement of “appropriate 
equitable relief” under ERISA.  Part V examines the conflict between the 
policies of ERISA and the policies of state legislatures in limiting or capping 
injury recoveries.  Part VI analyzes equitable principles that should be 
considered when dealing with the intersection of ERISA subrogation and 
reimbursement claims against statutorily limited or capped recoveries.  Part 
VII will present arguments and make a call for judicial action in the form of a 
changed interpretation of “appropriate equitable relief” under Section 
502(a)(3) of ERISA. 
II.  THE PURPOSES OF ERISA 
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to address the failure and 
mismanagement of many employer-sponsored pension funds.24  Congress 
determined that federal law should exclusively govern employee benefit 
plans.25  Although originally intending only to regulate retirement plans, 
Congress eventually extended ERISA to include all employee benefit plans, 
including Medical Plans, Disability Plans, and Qualified Retirement Plans.26  
This article will limit its analysis to Medical Plans [hereinafter referred to as 
“plans”] that provide payments for medical costs that later become the subject 
of a third party recovery by an injured employee. 
Three core policies motivated the enactment of ERISA: 
(1) to protect the rights of plan participants to the benefits promised to them 
under the terms of the plan (the “benefit protection policy”); (2) to avoid 
imposing undue administrative burden on employers that would financially 
deter them from voluntarily sponsoring plans for their employees (the “cost 
 
 22. Medill, supra note 17, at 834. 
 23. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) 
(2000). 
 24. Robert C. Sheres, Note, Setting the Stage for Creative Lawyering in ERISA 
Reimbursement Actions, 31 NOVA L. REV. 187, 190 (2006).  See also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 
508 U.S. 248, 264 (1993). 
 25. Sheres, supra note 24, at 190–91. 
 26. Id.  See also 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (stating that the Act “shall apply to any employee 
benefit plan”). 
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minimization policy”); and (3) to preserve the right of the employer as the 
settlor of the plan to customize the design of the plan and the plan’s package of 
benefits to the employer’s workforce and budget (the “settlor function 
policy”).27 
While the benefit protection policy is superior to the cost-minimization and 
settlor policies, the Supreme Court has noted the competing nature of these 
goals, stating that there is a “tension between the primary [ERISA] goal of 
benefiting employees and the subsidiary goal of containing . . . costs.”28 
ERISA defines an “employee benefit plan” as “any plan, fund, or 
program . . . established . . . by an employer . . . for the purpose of 
providing . . . (A) medical, surgical or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in 
the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment. . . .”29  
“Participants” in employee benefit plans are defined to include employees or 
former employees.30  A “beneficiary” is a person designated by the terms of 
the plan or by the participant who is or may become entitled to a benefit under 
the plan.31  A “fiduciary” is a person who has control over the plan or its 
assets.32  Courts have interpreted the statutory concept of “fiduciary” broadly.33  
The key factors considered are discretion, authority, or control over the plan or 
its assets.34  The fiduciary is required to diligently “discharge his duties with 
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries” for 
the exclusive purposes of: (1) providing benefits to participants and 
beneficiaries and (2) defraying reasonable expenses of the plan, all in accord 
with the plan documents.35  Once an employer has a program that is an ERISA 
qualified “employee benefit plan,” the plan has access to the federal courts in 
most controversies and has an existence apart from the employer, constituting 
a separate legal entity that “may sue or be sued.”36 
 
 27. Medill, supra note 17, at 919. 
 28. Id. at 920.  See also Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262–63. 
 29. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). 
 30. § 1002(7). 
 31. § 1002(8). 
 32. § 1002(21). 
 33. Chicago Bd. Options Exchange, Inc. v. Conn. General Life Ins. Co., 713 F.2d 254, 250 
(7th Cir. 1983). 
 34. Id. 
 35. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). 
 36. § 1132(d)(1). 
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Sections 51437 and 50238 of ERISA embody the goals of Congress.  
Section 514 outlines ERISA’s preemptive effect on state laws.39  Section 502 
outlines ERISA’s exclusive remedial scheme.40  Section 514, sometimes called 
the “preemption clause,” provides that ERISA “shall supersede any and all 
[s]tate laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee 
benefit plan.”41  The statutory text of ERISA does not indicate how close a 
relationship is required to satisfy the “relate to” language for ERISA 
preemption; however, the Supreme Court has defined the phrase as having a 
“broad preemptive meaning.”42  Section 514 effectuates complete federal 
preemption, meaning that any action filed in state court may be removed to 
federal court, even if a federal law violation is not pled.43  Section 502, the 
“civil enforcement” provision, enumerates the exclusive remedies available in 
ERISA actions by stating the following: 
A civil action  may be brought . . . by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary (A) 
to enjoin any act or practice which violated any provision of this subchapter or 
the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to 
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or 
the terms of the plan.44 
 Appropriate equitable relief has been conclusively interpreted not to 
include claims for punitive, consequential, compensatory, or other state 
specific damages resulting from a breach of the benefits plan contract.45  
However, the types of remedies embraced under the guise of ERISA’s 
appropriate equitable relief have evolved due to three Supreme Court 
 
 37. § 1144.  Section 514 of ERISA is also printed in the United States Code under Section 
1144 and the two provisions are used interchangeably.  See ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE § 
2-107 (Michael G. Kushner & Karen Hsu eds., 1999). 
 38. 29 U.S.C. § 1132.  Section 502 of ERISA is also printed in the United States Code under 
Section 1132 and the provisions are used interchangeably.  See ERISA: THE LAW AND THE 
CODE, supra note 37, § 2-107. 
 39. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (“provisions of this . . . chapter shall supersede any and all State laws 
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in . . . this title 
and not exempt under . . . this title”). 
 40. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (entitled “Civil enforcement”). 
 41. § 1144. 
 42. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (stating that the broad common 
sense meaning of the phrase “relate to” means having “a connection with or reference to”). 
 43. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64–65 (1987).  See also Jass v. Prudential 
Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1488–90 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 44. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (emphasis added). 
 45. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993) (noting that Section 502(a)(3)’s 
provision for other appropriate equitable relief does not permit the recovery of consequential 
damages).  See also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985) (asserting that 
the language of ERISA does not support “a private right of action for compensatory or punitive 
relief”). 
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decisions, discussed in Part IV.46  Because of this varied judicial interpretation, 
the ability of ERISA plans to seek subrogation or reimbursement of medical 
benefits paid from third party recoveries has changed dramatically.  Part III 
presents a background discussion of the purposes of subrogation and 
reimbursement in the context of ERISA. 
III.  SUBROGATION AND REIMBURSEMENT 
“Subrogation and reimbursement are related doctrines intended to prevent 
unjust enrichment and injustice.”47  Subrogation “is a creature of equity; . . . 
enforced solely for the purpose of accomplishing the ends of substantial 
justice.”48  Subrogation has been referred to as “a species of spontaneous 
agency.”49  Subrogation allows the subrogee (the ERISA plan) to stand in the 
shoes of its subrogor (the insured participant) to recover benefits paid by the 
plan.50  Subrogation transfers to the ERISA plan the participant’s right to 
recover benefits from a third party.51 
A plan’s subrogation rights must arise out of its contractual provisions.52  
State judiciaries and legislatures disfavor enforcement of subrogation rights 
“because it seems to violate the public policies against assigning personal 
injury claims and the prohibition against splitting causes of action.”53  “To 
avoid violating these public policies,” plans have “redesigned the language of 
their contracts to grant them the right of reimbursement” as well as the right of 
subrogation and have continually attempted to enforce these provisions.54  
Reimbursement is distinct from subrogation in that it is a contractual right 
contained in the plan allowing it to receive payment from a participant’s 
 
 46. See generally Sereboff v. Mid-Atlantic Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006) (outlining 
forms equitable relief that would allow an ERISA plan to achieve reimbursement of a member’s 
tort recovery under the terms of its plan); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 
U.S. 204 (2002) (drawing a sharp distinction between legal remedies and the equitable remedies 
available under § 502(a)(3)); Mertens, 508 U.S. 248 (defining equitable relief as “something less 
than all relief”). 
 47. Sheres, supra note 24, at 194. 
 48. Memphis & Little Rock R.R. Co. v. Dow, 120 U.S. 287, 301–02 (1887).  See also 
Standard Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, 152 N.E.2d 500, 501–03 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958); People ex. rel. 
Nelson v. Philip State Bank & Trust Co., 30 N.E.2d 771, 773 (Ill. App. Ct. 1940). 
 49. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Petroleum Navigation Co., 35 F. Supp. 350, 351 
(W.D. Wash. 1940) (quoting Durante v. Eannaco, 438, 72 N.Y.S. 1048, 1050 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1901)). 
 50. Unisys Med. Plan v. Timm, 98 F.3d 971, 973 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Walker v. Rose, 22 F. Supp. 2d 343, 351 (D. N.J. 1998) (noting that ERISA “says 
nothing” about subrogation or reimbursement requiring such provisions to arise from the terms of 
the plan). 
 53. Sheres, supra note 24, at 194. 
 54. Id. 
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recovery against a third party.55  “The effect of this redrafting was to create the 
economic reality of subrogation . . . without its language.”56  A plan may 
include either or both rights, and plan provisions often use the terms 
interchangeably.57 
ERISA does not require specific authority for a particular plan provision 
due to the broad discretion given trustees.58  ”ERISA says nothing about 
subrogation/reimbursement provisions.”59  Therefore, the Act does not 
preclude an ERISA plan from enforcing a subrogation or reimbursement 
provision contained in the plan against a participant.  However, because 
ERISA is silent on the matter of subrogation of benefits, federal common law 
governs the enforcement of a welfare benefit plan’s subrogation 
rights.60  Courts typically give full effect to the reimbursement language in a 
plan, holding participants responsible for paying back a benefit plan pursuant 
to the reimbursement provisions.61  Reimbursement is only required, however, 
to the extent required by the terms of the plan.  An ambiguous provision 
purporting to create a right of reimbursement is construed against the drafter 
and in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the participant.62 
Accordingly, whatever rights a plan has to recovery are governed by the plan’s 
written provisions. 
The ability of ERISA plans to enforce subrogation and reimbursement 
rights have hinged on the interpretation and application of Section 502, the 
“civil enforcement” provision of ERISA.63  Section 502 enumerates that the 
exclusive remedy available in ERISA actions to enforce terms of the plan are 
actions for “appropriate equitable relief.”64  The ability of ERISA plans to 
bring actions claiming reimbursement or subrogation for medical benefits paid 
 
 55. Timm, 98 F.3d at 973. 
 56. Sheres, supra note 24, at 194–95 (quoting Lee v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 129 
Cal. Rptr. 271, 278 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)). 
 57. See Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1297–99 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 58. See Chicago Bd. Options Exchange, Inc. v. Conn. General Life Ins. Co., 713 F.2d 254, 
250 (7th Cir. 1983).  See also Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 
1104(a)(1) (2000). 
 59. Walker v. Rose, 22 F. Supp. 2d 343, 351 (D. N.J. 1998). 
 60. See Cutting, 993 F.2d at 1296–97 (stating “[t]here is no doubt about the authority of the 
federal courts to create common law for use in ERISA cases”). 
 61. Serembus ex rel. UIU Health & Welfare Fund v. Mathwig, 817 F. Supp. 1414, 1423 
(E.D. Wis. 1992). 
 62. Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, 67 F.3d. 53, 57 (4th Cir. 1995); 
Germany v. Operating Eng’rs Trust Fund of Washington, D.C., 789 F. Supp. 1165, 1169–70 (D. 
D.C. 1992). 
 63. See generally Sereboff v. Mid-Atlantic Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006); Great-
West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 
U.S. 248, 264 (1993). 
 64. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000). 
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against a third party recovery by one of its members has dramatically changed 
over the past thirty years in response to interpretation of Section 502 by the 
United States Supreme Court. 
IV.  THE SUPREME COURT’S EVOLVING INTERPRETATION OF “APPROPRIATE 
EQUITABLE RELIEF” 
The Supreme Court has taken three opportunities to interpret the meaning 
of “appropriate equitable relief” as used in Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA.  First, 
in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, the Court addressed for the first time the 
question of the types of remedies available under Section 502(a)(3), noting that 
equitable relief designated by the statute is something less than all relief.65  
Next, in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Company v. Knudson, the Court 
drew a sharp distinction between legal remedies and the equitable remedies 
available under Section 502(a)(3), finding that if the action was one for 
recovery of money, it was legal and could not be brought under ERISA’s 
exclusive provision of equitable relief.66  Finally, in Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic 
Medical Services, Inc., while the Court preserved the historical distinction 
between legal and equitable remedies, the Court outlined equitable remedies 
available that would allow a plan to achieve reimbursement and subrogation.67 
A. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates 
In Mertens, the petitioners represented a class of former employees who 
participated in the Kaiser Steel Retirement Plan, a pension plan that qualified 
under ERISA.68  A class of former employees sued the plan’s actuary, Hewitt 
Associates, under Section 502(a)(3).69  When the plan’s sponsor, Kaiser, began 
to phase out its steelmaking operations—prompting a large number of plan 
participants to opt for early retirement—Hewitt Associates did not change the 
plan’s actuarial assumptions to reflect the additional costs of the increased 
retirements.70  Plan assets eventually became insufficient to cover the benefit 
obligations, and the plan participants sued for breach of fiduciary duty.71  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari only on the question of “whether ERISA 
authorizes suits for money damages against nonfiduciaries who knowingly 
participate in a fiduciary’s breach of fiduciary duty.”72 
 
 65. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 258 n.8. 
 66. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 216, 218. 
 67. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 361–63. 
 68. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 250. 
 69. Id. at 250–53. 
 70. Id. at 250. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 251. 
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The plan participants maintained that the suit sought “appropriate equitable 
relief” under Section 502(a)(3).73  The Supreme Court held that ERISA did not 
authorize suits for money damages in such cases.74  The Court noted that the 
plan participants were seeking money damages, amounting to nothing more 
than compensatory damages.75  According to the Court, these compensatory 
damages were a classic form of legal relief and not a form of equitable relief.76  
Although the Court had not previously interpreted the phrase “appropriate 
equitable relief,” the Court had construed similar language in Title VII to 
preclude “awards for compensatory or punitive damages.”77  By looking to 
Title VII for guidance in the ERISA context, the Court eschewed ERISA’s 
roots in the common law of trusts.78  The Court acknowledged that equitable 
relief could mean two things: (1) whatever relief a court of equity is 
empowered to provide in the particular case at issue, or (2) those categories of 
relief that were historically available in equity such as injunction, mandamus, 
and restitution, but not compensatory damages.79  The Court chose the latter 
more restrictive definition.80 
According to the Court, reading equitable relief to mean “all remedies 
available from a common law court of equity” would in no way limit the relief 
available and would render an important modifier in the statute superfluous.81  
The Court reasoned that “‘[e]quitable’ relief” as used in Section 502(a)(3) 
“must mean something less than all relief.”82  The Court’s decision was based 
on a strict textual reading of the statute, but was also policy driven.  According 
to Justice Scalia: “ERISA . . . defines ‘fiduciary’ not in terms of formal 
trusteeship, but in functional terms of control and authority over the plan . . . 
thus expanding the universe of persons subject to fiduciary duties—and to 
damages—under § 409(a).”83  Thus, “[a]ll that ERISA has eliminated . . . is the 
common law’s joint and several liability, for all direct and consequential 
damages suffered by the plan, on the part of persons who had no real power to 
control what the plan did.”84  According to Justice Scalia, exposure to this type 
of liability would raise insurance costs for persons who regularly deal with 
 
 73. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255 (emphasis in original). 
 74. Id. at 263. 
 75. Id. at 255. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 255 (citing United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 238 (1992)). 
 78. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255, 257 (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 
101, 110–11 (1989)). 
 79. Id. at 255–56. 
 80. Id. at 257–58. 
 81. Id. at 258. 
 82. Id. at 258 n.8 (emphasis in original). 
 83. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262 (emphasis in original). 
 84. Id. 
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ERISA plans and, therefore, for ERISA plans themselves.85  Furthermore, 
“[t]here is . . . a ‘tension between the primary [ERISA] goal of benefiting 
employees and the subsidiary goal of containing pension costs.’”86  The Court, 
in Justice Scalia’s words, would not attempt to adjust the balance that Congress 
has struck between these competing goals.87 
B. Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Company v. Knudson 
In a second attempt, Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Company v. 
Knudson, the Supreme Court addressed the equitable remedy question in the 
context of an ERISA reimbursement provision.88  Janette Knudson was 
rendered quadriplegic as a result of a 1992 car accident.  Janette was covered 
by an ERISA plan.89  The plan covered $411,157.11 of Janette’s medical 
expenses.90  The plan included a reimbursement provision, which provided that 
the plan “shall have the right to recover from the [beneficiary] any payment for 
benefits paid by the Plan that the beneficiary is entitled to recover from a third 
party.”91  If a beneficiary recovered from a third party and failed to reimburse 
the plan, the beneficiary was personally liable to the plan.92 
The Knudsons eventually filed a tort action in state court, in which they 
sought to recover from the manufacturer of the vehicle they were riding in at 
the time of the accident, along with other tortfeasors.93  The parties negotiated 
a $650,000 settlement and notice was sent to the plan.94  After judicial 
allocation of the settlement,95 Janette only recovered $256,745.30 for her 
debilitating injuries,96 which was allocated to a Special Needs Trust under 
California law to provide for Janette’s medical care.97 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 262–263 (quoting Alessi v. Rabestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 515 (1981)). 
 87. Id. at 263. 
 88. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002). 
 89. Id. at 207. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 207. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 207–08.  The judicial allocation of the settlement proceeds was as follows: 
$373,426 to attorney's fees and costs; $5,000 to reimburse the California Medicaid program; and 
$13,828.70 to satisfy Great-West’s claim under the reimbursement provision of the Plan.  Great-
West did not cash the check. 
 96. Id. 
 97. A special needs trust is designed to protect the government benefits of disabled people 
who inherit property, settle claims, or win judgments.  “In California, the term ‘special needs 
trust’ generally refers to an irrevocable trust that gives the trustee discretion to supplement, but 
not supplant, whatever is provided by government programs to the trust's beneficiary.”  Terry M. 
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The state court approved the settlement and directed the defendants to pay 
the settlement amount directly to the Special Needs Trust and the remaining 
amount to the Knudsons’ attorney.98  The attorney then tendered a check in the 
amount of $13,828.70 to the plan for reimbursement.99  The plan never cashed 
the check and instead filed suit in federal court seeking injunctive and 
declaratory relief under ERISA Section 502(a)(3).100  The plan sought to 
enforce the reimbursement provision requiring the Knudsons to pay the plan 
$411,157.11 out of the proceeds recovered from the third parties.101 
The district court granted summary judgment to the Knudsons, holding that 
the plan only required reimbursement in the amount of $13,828.70, covering 
past medical treatment.102  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court and 
held that the judicially decreed reimbursement for payments made to a 
beneficiary by a third party is not equitable relief and is thus not available 
under Section 502(a)(3).103  The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue 
of whether Section 502(a)(3) authorized the plan to take “this action” to 
enforce a reimbursement provision of an ERISA plan.104  The Court held that 
ERISA did not authorize the plan to seek restitution to obtain reimbursement 
from Janette.105 
The Supreme Court relied on the reasoning in Mertens “that Congress did 
not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate 
expressly.”106  The Court also reinforced the point that “equitable relief must 
mean something less than all relief.”107  In the Court’s opinion, suits seeking to 
compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff, whether by 
judgment or injunction, almost invariably are suits for “money damages” or 
legal relief.108  The Court stated that “not all relief falling under the rubric of 
restitution is available in equity.”109  Although restitution was typically 
available in equity, it was also available in certain cases at law.110  According 
 
Magady, Something Special, L.A. LAW., Feb. 2002, at 26.  The goal of a special needs trust is to 
enable a disabled beneficiary to benefit from both the trust and the government programs.  Id. 
 98. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 207–08. 
 99. Id. at 208. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 208–09. 
 103. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 209. 
 104. Id. at 206. 
 105. Id. at 221. 
 106. Id. at 209 (emphasis in original) (citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 254, 
258 (1993)).  The Court reiterated that the term equitable relief in Section 502(a)(3) must refer to 
those categories of relief that were typically available in equity.  Id. 
 107. Id. at 209 (emphasis in original). 
 108. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 210. 
 109. Id. at 212. 
 110. Id. at 206 (citing 1 DAN D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.2, at 11 (2d ed. 1993)). 
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to the majority opinion, whether or not restitution is equitable or legal depends 
on the basis of the plaintiff’s claim and the nature of the remedies sought.111 
In cases in which the plaintiff “could not assert title or right to possession 
of particular property, but in which . . . he might be able to show just grounds 
for recovering money to pay for some benefit the defendant had received from 
him,” the plaintiff had a right to restitution, not in equity, but at law.112  In 
contrast, a plaintiff could seek restitution in equity, ordinarily in the form of a 
constructive trust or an equitable lien, where money or property identified as 
belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be traced to 
particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession.113  “Thus, for an 
action to lie in equity, the action generally must seek not to impose personal 
liability on the defendant, but to restore to the plaintiff particular funds or 
property in the defendant’s possession.”114 
In the Knudson case, the plan sought the proceeds from the Knudsons’ tort 
action, which were never in the possession of the Knudsons.115  The basis for 
the claim was not that the Knudsons held particular funds that, in good 
conscience, belonged to the plan, but that the plan was contractually entitled to 
some funds for benefits that they conferred: “[t]he kind of restitution that [the 
plan sought], therefore, is not equitable—the imposition of a constructive trust 
or equitable lien on particular property—but legal—the imposition of personal 
liability for the benefits that they conferred upon [the Knudsons].”116 Even 
though the Court admitted that it had never “previously drawn this fine 
distinction” of law and equity, the Court strictly construed the plain statutory 
language.117  Thus, the plan was not entitled to this type of remedy under 
ERISA.118 
After Knudson, the circuits split over whether a fiduciary could enforce a 
subrogation provision under Section 502(a)(3).  The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, 
Eighth and Tenth Circuits decided that if a plaintiff’s request for 
reimbursement under ERISA Section 502(a)(3) did not seek to impose 
personal liability but instead sought relief (such as a constructive trust or 
equitable lien) against identifiable funds in the actual or constructive 
possession of the insured, the relief was equitable in nature and, therefore, 
 
 111. Id. at 213. 
 112. Id. at 214. 
 113. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 215 (quoting Reich v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 
1994)). 
 114. Id. at 214. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 214. 
 118. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 217–18. 
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permitted under Section 502(a)(3).119 The Sixth and Ninth Circuits, by 
contrast, found that any attempt by an insurer to enforce a subrogation or 
reimbursement clause was a request that constituted legal relief and was not 
available under ERISA.120 
C. Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services 
In its final interpretation of the equitable relief available under ERISA, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit in Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical 
Services, Inc.121  The Sereboffs received nearly $75,000 medical benefits from 
MAMSI, an ERISA plan, following an automobile accident.122  They 
subsequently recovered $750,000 in a personal injury verdict in state court 
against the third party tortfeasors.123  MAMSI requested payment from the 
Sereboffs and their attorney under the terms of the plan.124  The Sereboffs and 
their attorney rejected MAMSI’s position and refused to reimburse the plan.125  
Instead, the Sereboffs’ attorney “disbursed the funds to the Sereboffs and his 
law firm, pursuant to their representation agreement in the California 
litigation.”126 “The Sereboffs then placed the funds into their investment 
accounts.”127  “When the Sereboffs failed to reimburse MAMSI for the 
medical benefits it had paid, MAMSI sued, asserting that, as plan beneficiaries, 
 
 119. See Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., Inc. v. Sereboff, 407 F.3d 212, 217–21 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(“We agree with the district court that, in this dispute, MAMSI's action seeks equitable 
restitution, as that term is used in Knudson, because MAMSI seeks to recover funds that are 
specifically identifiable, belong in good conscience to MAMSI, and are within the possession and 
control of the Sereboffs.”), aff'd, 547 U.S. 356 (2006); N. Am. Coal Corp. v. Roth, 395 F.3d 916, 
917 (8th Cir. 2005) (Plaintiff stated claims under Section 1132(a)(3) and the district court 
properly imposed a constructive trust on overpaid benefits, permanently enjoined defendants from 
disposing of or transferring funds in their possession and required tracing of funds no longer in 
defendants' possession.); Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Assocs. Health & Welfare Plan v. 
Willard, 393 F.3d 1119, 1120, 1125 (10th Cir. 2004) (Action seeking injunction, declaration of 
rights, constructive trust and equitable restitution was equitable in nature as in Knudson, even 
though defendant never had disputed funds in his possession.); Bombardier Aerospace Employee 
Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot & Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 358 (5th Cir. 2003); 
Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs. Health & Welfare Plan v. Varco, 338 F.3d 
680, 687–88 (7th Cir. 2003); Bauhaus USA, Inc. v. Copeland, 292 F.3d 439, 445 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 120. See Qualchoice, Inc. v. Rowland, 367 F.3d 638, 650 (6th Cir. 2004); Westaff (USA) Inc. 
v. Arce, 298 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 121. Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 369 (2006). 
 122. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., LLC v. Sereboff, 407 F.3d 212, 214 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 123. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 360. 
 124. Sereboff, 407 F.3d at 214–15. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 216. 
 127. Id. 
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[the Sereboffs] had failed to comply with their subrogation obligations to 
reimburse it for benefits paid on their behalf.”128 
MAMSI sued under Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA.129  The district court 
granted summary judgment, holding that MAMSI was “entitled to recover the 
disputed proceeds under the terms of the Plan” and that MAMSI was indeed 
seeking “equitable relief” under Section 502(a)(3).130  The Fourth Circuit 
affirmed, holding that MAMSI’s action sought equitable restitution as the term 
was used in Knudson because MAMSI sought to “recover funds that are 
specifically identifiable, belong in good conscience to MAMSI, and are within 
possession and control of the Sereboffs.”131  In essence, the Fourth Circuit 
adopted the majority position stated above and specifically rejected the 
minority position held by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits.132 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit.133  It first considered 
whether the type of relief MAMSI sought was equitable or legal.134  The Court 
determined that MAMSI sought an “equitable lien” which could be properly 
characterized as equitable because the funds were specifically identifiable and 
remained in the possession and control of the Sereboffs.135  The Court next 
analyzed whether the basis for MAMSI’s claim was equitable, applying “the 
familiar rul[e] of equity that a contract to convey a specific object even before 
it is acquired will make the contractor a trustee as soon as he gets a title to the 
thing.”136  The Court drew a parallel between MAMSI’s claim and that of an 
equitable lien claim “of the sort epitomized by our decision in Barnes.”137 
Barnes v. Alexander was a case decided by the Supreme Court in 1914.138  
Barnes, an attorney, promised two other attorneys one-third of the contingency 
fee he expected in a case.139  The Court found Barnes’ undertaking created a 
lien upon the fee due to him from the client that “as soon as it was identified, 
[the other attorneys] could follow it into the hands [of Barnes].”140  The Court 
based its decision on “one of the familiar rules of equity that a contract to 
 
 128. Id. at 214. 
 129. Sereboff, 407 F.3d at 214. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 218. 
 132. See supra Part VI.B. 
 133. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 369. 
 134. Id. at 362. 
 135. Id. at 362–63. 
 136. Id. at 363–64 (quoting Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U.S. 117, 121 (1914)). 
 137. Id. at 368. 
 138. Barnes, 232 U.S. at 117. 
 139. Id. at 119. 
 140. Id. at 123. 
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convey a specific object even before it is acquired will make the contractor a 
trustee as soon as he gets a title to the thing.” 141 
The Court reasoned that MAMSI’s plan provisions, like Barnes’ promise, 
specifically identified a particular fund distinct from the Sereboffs’ general 
assets and the particular share to which the plan was entitled.  Thus, the plan 
could rely on the familiar rule of equity to collect for the medical bills it had 
paid by following a portion of the recovery into the Sereboffs’ hands as soon 
as the settlement fund was identified and imposing on that portion of a 
constructive trust or equitable lien.142  The Court found: 
the “Acts of Third Parties” provision in the Sereboffs’ plan specifically 
identified a particular fund, distinct from the Sereboffs’ general assets—”[a]ll 
recoveries from a third party (whether by lawsuit, settlement, or otherwise)”—
and a particular share of that fund to which [MAMSI] was entitled—”that 
portion of the total recovery which is due [MAMSI] for benefits paid.”143 
MAMSI therefore “could rely on a ‘familiar rul[e] of equity’ to collect for the 
medical bills it had paid on the Sereboffs’ behalf”144 by following a portion of 
the recovery into the hands of the Sereboffs as soon as the settlement fund was 
identified and by imposing an equitable lien on that amount.145  The Court held 
that the “strict tracing rules” that may have accompanied an action for 
equitable restitution at common law do not apply to equitable liens imposed by 
agreement or assignment.146  The Court effectively acknowledged that money 
is fungible, so no “tracing” of money is needed.147 
The Supreme Court clarified its holding in Knudson, noting that “[t]here 
was no need in Knudson to catalog all the circumstances in which equitable 
liens were available in equity; Great-West claimed a right to recover in 
restitution, and the Court concluded only that equitable restitution was 
unavailable because the funds sought were not in Knudson’s possession.”148  In 
summary, the Supreme Court restricted any strict tracing requirement to claims 
for equitable restitution and allowed MAMSI to seek an equitable lien on the 
facts before the Court.149 
After Sereboff, it is clear that a plan’s claim for reimbursement or 
subrogation must be equitable and based on a claim for unjust enrichment 
designed to enforce plan terms against identifiable property.150  The plan’s 
 
 141. Id. at 121. 
 142. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 364. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. (citing Barnes, 232 U.S. at 121). 
 145. Id. at 364. 
 146. Id. at 365. 
 147. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 365. 
 148. Id. (emphasis added). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See id. at 356. 
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action to enforce payment was the same as equitable lien enforcement.151  The 
plan could “follow a portion of the recovery” into Sereboff’s hands.152  
Sereboff leaves some questions unanswered.  While Sereboff preserved 
Knudson’s historical vision of the dichotomy of law and equity, it is yet 
unclear whether equitable defenses can be litigated.153  The Court commented 
that, while equitable defenses to an equitable subrogation claim were 
unavailable when a lien was created by agreement of the parties, the Court did 
not completely foreclose the possibility of bringing equitable defenses or 
conducting an inquiry to determine whether equitable relief is “appropriate.”154  
If equitable defenses can be alleged, the most resounding call for such defenses 
would be within the context of a capped recovery. 
V.  THE CONFLICT OF “APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE RELIEF” AND STATUTORILY 
LIMITED OR CAPPED RECOVERY 
While hidden behind the evolving reasoning of the Supreme Court as to 
the meaning of appropriate equitable relief, one distinction remains clear when 
examining the difference in the outcomes of Knudson and Sereboff.  In 
Knudson, a participant was rendered a quadraplegic and received only 
$256,745.30 for her debilitating injuries, which was allocated to a Special 
Needs Trust under California law to provide for future medical care.155  In 
Sereboff, the recovery was much greater and the injured parties were able to 
invest funds recovered from the tortfeasor.156  While one distinction in the 
cases seem to be based on whether the injured parties actually received the 
funds from the settlement, clearly the sympathies of the Court could have been 
an important factor in the distinctions between these two decisions. 
The dilemma in interpreting appropriate equitable relief develops when 
there are not enough potential assets in the recovery to satisfy all obligations.  
Subrogation and reimbursement of benefits advanced by a plan would be fairly 
straightforward if participants suffering injuries at the hands of third parties 
always recovered the amount of their actual medical expenses from the 
tortfeasor in addition to compensation for lost wages, disability, future medical 
care, pain and suffering, attorneys’ fees, and costs of litigation.  The tort 
system has been said to have two primary goals: “(1) to compensate persons 
who are injured through the negligence of others; and (2) to deter future 
negligent behavior,” both in the specific defendant and in others through the 
 
 151. Id. at 363. 
 152. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 364. 
 153. Id. at 368. 
 154. Id. at 361. 
 155. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 207–08 (2000). 
 156. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., LLC v. Sereboff, 407 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005). 
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precedent created.157  However, today’s climate of capped damages in many 
areas of recovery result in compromise settlements and verdicts that fail to 
cover all damages. 
Many states have enacted various forms of tort reform that limit recovery 
for all torts or a limited number of specified torts, including medical 
negligence cases, dramshop cases, nursing home negligence cases, and 
products liability cases.158  All states have enacted state workers’ compensation 
schemes that limit the potential for tort recovery by injured workers.159  When 
ERISA collides with state statutory schemes that limit or cap the recovery of 
injured persons, the result is truly not appropriate or equitable.  To support this 
conclusion, the examples of dramshop statutes and workers’ compensation 
systems will be analyzed. 
Dramshop.  Dramshop liability has the primary goal of compensating 
innocent third parties for the injuries they suffer when they are injured by 
intoxicated tortfeasors.160  Dramshop statutes attempt to reallocate some of the 
social cost of drinking from the drinkers themselves to the businesses that 
profit from the sale of alcoholic beverages.161  Illinois162  has adopted a statute 
that essentially amounts to strict liability when injuries are caused by the 
intoxication of the dramshop’s patron, no matter what the circumstances of the 
sale.163  Illinois, however, has limited the damages available in dramshop 
actions.164  In 2007, Illinois placed absolute caps on the damages that 
dramshops may be forced to pay at $56,302.45.165  Damage caps benefit 
dramshops because they lessen the possibility that a single lawsuit will put the 
dramshop out of business and make it easier for the dramshop to purchase 
insurance to protect itself.166 
 
 157. Adam G. Winters, Where There’s Smoke, Is There Fire? An Empirical Analysis of the 
Tort “Crisis” in Illinois, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1347, 1349 (2007). 
 158. Robert S. Peck & Ned Miltenberg, Challenging the Constitutionality of Tort ‘Reform’, in 
3 LITIGATING TORT CASES § 29.20 (2007). 
 159. Gwen Forté, Rethinking America’s Approach to Workplace Safety: A Model for 
Advancing Safety Issues in the Chemical Industry, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 513, 519–23 (2006). 
 160. Richard Smith, A Comparative Analysis of Dramshop Liability and a Proposal for 
Uniform Legislation, 25 J. CORP. L. 553, 557 (2000). 
 161. Id. at 554. 
 162. The author chose the state of Illinois because it is the jurisdiction where the case 
referenced in the introduction, Trustees of the Carpenters’ Health and Welfare Trust Fund of St. 
Louis v. Brunkhorst, No. 05-382-DRH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38107 at *1 (S.D. Ill. 2006), was 
pending. 
 163. 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-21 (2006); Smith, supra note 160, at 557. 
 164. § 5/6-21. 
 165. See DRAM SHOP LIABILITY LIMITS, supra note 5. 
 166. Smith, supra note 160, at 573. 
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However, damage caps lie in stark contrast to the primary goal of tort law, 
to compensate victims who suffer harm due to the tortious conduct of others.167 
When compensatory damages are limited, it severely undercuts the rationale of 
the entire tort system, especially when the medical expenses arising from the 
tortious conduct of a single drunk driver can easily exceed the damages cap, 
the cap can render a dramshop action almost meaningless in the event of a 
serious accident.168 
Recoveries are further reduced by the typical one-third contingency fees 
charged by attorneys who prosecute these suits.169  It has been argued that 
“having made the policy decision that dramshops may be liable in tort to third 
parties for the improper service of alcohol, legislatures should not then remove 
any chance for meaningful recovery by the most seriously injured victims of an 
intoxicated customer.”170  What state legislatures, such as Illinois, probably 
never considered in their decisions to cap dramshop damages was the impact 
of ERISA as likely reducing—or completely obliterating—compensation of 
those injured by intoxicated persons. 
Workers’ Compensation.  Employers who provide workers’ compensation 
benefits enjoy immunity from suit by their employees for injuries arising out of 
employment.171  Most state workers’ compensation statutes create a no-fault 
compensation system.172 Negligence is irrelevant to the determination of 
whether an employee is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.173  
Employees have a right to workers’ compensation benefits for work-related 
injuries, regardless of fault.174 
“The right to benefits and amount of benefits are based largely on a social 
theory of providing support and preventing destitution, rather than settling 
accounts between two individuals according to their personal deserts [sic] or 
blame.”175  Employees sacrifice their rights to an action in tort and their ability 
to collect damages for pain and suffering in exchange for prompt compensation 
every time they sustain an injury during work.176  Unlike tort recovery, a 
worker’s compensation system does not seek to return to the employee what he 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See GILLERS, supra note 4, at 143–45. 
 170. Smith, supra note 160, at 573–74. 
 171. Forté, supra note 159, at 519–23.  See also Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/5-11 (1994). 
 172. § 305/2; ILLINOIS LAW AND PRACTICE, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, 37 I.L.P. 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION § 2, at 216 (2007). 
 173. ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION § 2.10 (1989). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 1–2. 
 176. See generally Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 356–59 (Ill. 1978). 
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has lost, but it enables the employee to live without burdening others.177  The 
amount of compensation is often regarded as being not much higher than 
necessary to keep the employee from destitution.178 
For example, the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act [IWCA] prohibits 
liens on recovery by providing that no workers’ compensation “payment, 
claim, award or decision shall be subject to any lien.”179  However, courts have 
held that ERISA preempts this state law.180  As a result, an injured worker’s 
limited compensation can be claimed by an ERISA plan through a 
reimbursement or subrogation provision, thereby frustrating the entire purpose 
of the legislature in enacting the workers’ compensation scheme. 
Policy Considerations.  Cases of statutorily capped or limited recovery by 
state legislatures make clear the need for equitable relief to protect the 
recoveries of an injured person.  It is unlikely that state legislatures take into 
consideration the preemptive effect of ERISA when enacting damage caps or 
statutorily limiting recovery through systems such as workers’ 
compensation.181  The policies of ERISA to protect the rights of plan 
participants to the health and welfare benefits promised to them by the terms of 
the plan received through their employment182 are also consistent with the 
policies of state legislatures that attempt to ensure that, while an employee is 
compensated for injury by intoxicated persons183 or while at work,184 business 
owners’ economic interests are protected.  Each legislative policy seeks a 
compromise to benefit both the business and the injured party by seeking to 
ensure business is economically feasible without denying compensation to 
injured persons.  However, when statutorily capped or limited recoveries 
intersect with the doctrine of the complete preemption of ERISA requiring an 
employee to reimburse the plan the entire amount of the limited or capped 
recovery, these policies are entirely at odds. 
The problem for plans and their participants becomes universal in that 
overpayments increase plan costs and reduce funds unnecessarily.  Injuries 
caused by third parties often involve large amounts of money and put plan 
assets at stake.  While the settling participant may not have much incentive to 
preserve the plan’s assets, other participants lose when the plan makes an 
 
 177. LARSON, supra note 173, at § 2.05.  See also ILLINOIS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 
172. 
 178. LARSON, supra note 173, at § 2.05. 
 179. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/2-1 (1994). 
 180. Health Cost Controls v. Manetas, No. 94 C 00419, 1995 WL 66383 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
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overpayment.185  The plan’s claims against participants to enforce the terms of 
the plan implicate all three core ERISA policies.  All of the participants are 
subject to the terms of the plan.  The plan terms dictate the benefits that each 
individual participant in the plan is entitled to receive.  If an individual 
participant receives a greater benefit amount than is permitted under the terms 
of the plan, the administrator must have the ability to enforce the plan’s terms 
and recoup the excess benefit amount.  If the plan is unable to effectively 
enforce its terms, ultimately the plan’s ability to pay the benefits promised to 
the other participants may be financially compromised.  Lack of effective 
enforcement of the plan’s terms undermines the employer’s ability to 
accurately estimate the costs of the plan’s benefits and design a benefit 
structure that is affordable to the employer.186 
For a plan to receive reimbursement, action must be taken to establish 
liability against the tortfeasor.  In the absence of action by the injured 
participant, the plan would be required to exercise its subrogation rights by 
filing a lawsuit against the tortfeasor on behalf of the injured participant.187  
Such action would involve coordinating the cooperation of the participant, 
hiring counsel to prosecute the lawsuit, paying the costs of litigation, and 
bearing the risks associated with the litigation.188  Failure of the plan to act on 
its own behalf would result in the plan remaining responsible for payment of 
the participants’ medical costs associated with the injury without 
reimbursement.  While it is unclear how often an ERISA plan exercises its 
subrogation rights to file suit on behalf of injured members against third 
parties, it appears unlikely that it would do so in light of the risk involved.  As 
long as the plan documents are strictly enforced without any consideration for 
the appropriateness of the equitable relief, it would not be logical for the plan 
to choose to pursue litigation at its own cost when it can successfully contract 
those costs away to its injured members.189 
When the injured member independently employs an attorney to achieve 
recovery against the tortfeasor and allocate responsibility, such action furthers 
the goals of society to deter future negligent behavior in the tortfeasor and 
others and to compensate injured persons.190  While the action of the injured 
participant to hold the tortfeasor responsible benefits himself, the community, 
and the plan, the current conflict between the federal law of ERISA and state 
statutory schemes capping or limiting damages dampens any motive to take 
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such action.  When recovery is limited or insufficient, the current interpretation 
of appropriate equitable relief under ERISA allows the plan to retain the entire 
benefit, without even relieving the participant of the costs of litigation or his 
attorneys’ fees.191  In such a state, most injured participants would conclude 
that it is not feasible to take any action against the tortfeasor, because the net 
result is only the injured member’s ultimate responsibility for the attorneys’ 
fees and costs of pursuing the action or termination of health benefits in order 
for the ERISA plan to recover these costs.192 
In the case presented in the beginning of the article, the injured party and 
his attorney took a risky cause of action and attempted to establish liability 
against a drinking establishment that allowed a person to become intoxicated, 
creating a hazardous and violent situation for its patrons.  Because liability was 
capped and the lawsuit was difficult to prove, only a limited recovery was 
available.  However, the attorney and the injured participant appealed to the 
state court where the action was pending to allocate the settlement fund to the 
proper parties.193  Neither the attorney nor injured participant was seeking a 
windfall or to avoid the obligations of the plan.  Under the allocation by the 
state court, no party recovered completely, but each party received 
compensation.194  However, instead of accepting partial reimbursement, the 
plan proceeded to sue the injured participant and threatened to withhold his 
family’s health insurance benefits.195  Although the plan was willing to spend 
its assets to litigate against the injured particpant, it was not willing to share in 
the participant’s attorneys’ fees that resulted in the availability of the funds.196  
The court incorrectly deemed that this result was “appropriate.”197 
Currently, ERISA harshly enforces the terms of a plan without any 
balancing of the appropriate equities.  In the absence of a clear, contractual 
provision to the contrary, an insured must be made whole before a plan can 
enforce its right to subrogation.  However, many ERISA plans require that the 
plan reimburse all expenses without regard for the make-whole doctrine, even 
renouncing litigation costs and attorneys’ fees for the recovery of the fund.198 
When subrogation and reimbursement provisions are clear, the federal 
common law holds that a court’s ability to fashion remedies is limited, and it is 
inappropriate for a court to fashion a common law remedy that contravenes the 
unambiguous subrogation provisions of a plan.199 When the plan’s provision 
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requires complete reimbursement, even over attorney’s fees and costs of 
litigation, the common law holds that it would be improper to allow an 
obligated participant to deduct a proportionate share of the participant’s 
attorney’s fees from reimbursement owed to the plan on the basis that the plan 
would be “unjustly enriched” if it did not share in the participant’s recovery 
expenses.200  The claim that ERISA’s core policies require the plan to be 
responsible for a pro rata reduction of its reimbursement to offset the costs of 
litigation has been rejected by some courts.201  If such blind enforcement of 
plan provisions that require complete subrogation and reimbursement in cases 
of limited or capped recovery continues, injured participants and their 
attorneys will fail to bring actions against tortfeasors, dramshops, employers, 
and others that cause harm to members of ERISA plans.  Subsequently, ERISA 
plans will stifle the social and economic benefits of the tort system by failing 
to provide equitable provisions in plans.  Courts should step in and award 
appropriate equitable relief. 
VI.  PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY—CAN THEY SOLVE THE CONFLICT? 
Equity is the “body of principles constituting what is fair and right.”202  
“Equity is a way of looking at the administration of justice; it is a set of 
effective and flexible remedies admirably adapted to the needs of a complex 
society; it is a body of substantive rules.”203 
In Sereboff, the participants argued that enforcement of the plan provision 
would be inappropriate “without imposing various limitations” that would 
apply to “truly equitable relief grounded in principles of subrogation.”204  The 
Court focused on the Sereboffs’ claim that they would be allowed to bring 
certain equitable defenses in an equitable subrogation action that would be 
available regardless of the plan’s provisions.205  The Court held that the plan’s 
claim was not “considered equitable because it is a subrogation claim”206 and 
explained that the enforcement of the plan’s provisions qualified as an 
“equitable remedy because it is indistinguishable from an action to enforce an 
equitable lien established by agreement, of the sort epitomized by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Barnes.”207 The Court held that the equitable remedies 
claimed by the Sereboffs, such as the make-whole doctrine, did not accompany 
 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id.  See also Bollman Hat Co. v. Root, 112 F.3d 113, 116–17 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 202. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 247 (8th ed. 2004). 
 203. Zecharia Chafee, Foreword, to SELECTED ESSAYS ON EQUITY, iii (Edward Donenic, Re, 
ed., 1955). 
 204. Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 368 (2006) (quoting Reply 
Brief for Petitioners at 5, No. 05-260). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
550 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII:527 
the plan’s action and were “beside the point.”208  The Sereboffs also claimed 
that if the plan’s action was equitable under Section 502(a)(3), it was not 
“appropriate.”209  The Supreme Court refused to hear this argument because it 
was not considered by the court below.210 
There are several important considerations embodied in this reasoning 
from Sereboff.  First, it is clear that the Supreme Court did not consider 
whether, how, or if the modifier “appropriate” in the statute would change its 
decision in the context of an argument based in equity.211  Because this issue 
has not been addressed, it remains an important consideration and a promising 
possibility to adjust subrogation or reimbursement recoveries by ERISA plans 
in cases where there is a statutorily limited or capped recovery.  Second, it 
characterized the plan’s claim as one for an equitable lien “of the sort 
epitomized by our decision in Barnes.”212  Distinguishing Barnes assists in the 
understanding of what potential equitable defenses may arise against the 
enforcement of an ERISA reimbursement or subrogation provision. 
The Supreme Court’s analogy between Barnes and the Sereboffs leaves 
much food for thought.  Initially, it must be noted that that the Court was 
attempting to enforce an equitable trust or lien by agreement.  In Barnes, that 
agreement existed between attorneys who were equitably dividing the work 
and risk of handling a case on a contingency fee.213  This lien by agreement 
occurred at arm’s length between sophisticated parties who were fully 
informed of the terms of the agreement.214  This type of agreement is distinct 
from the typical agreement between an ERISA plan and its participants, where 
ERISA plans are drafted by sophisticated parties and handed to employees who 
simply accept the health coverage offered by their employers as a benefit of 
employment.215 
Additionally, the agreement in Barnes was supported by the principles of 
equity.  In Barnes, the Court noted that each party performed the obligations 
required under the contract and were entitled to the benefits negotiated by the 
contract.216  By contrast, an ERISA reimbursement provision requiring full 
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reimbursement in a case where there is limited recovery and portions of the 
recovery are for damages other than medical expenses, it is not clear that such 
an agreement is equitable.  Finally, the Barnes Court allowed the attorneys to 
collect from the portion Barnes received as soon as the settlement fund was 
identified and in his hands.217  The question in ERISA actions is: what is the 
portion that is received by a participant that is identifiable and in his hands?  In 
the case discussed in the introduction, the injured member only collected 
$21,000 for his knife wounds.218  Because this amount did not come close to 
covering his lost wages, medical expenses, attorney’s fees and costs of 
litigation, the money was deposited with the state court in which the action was 
pending to adjudicate all claims and equitably allocate the money between 
interested parties.219  Can it properly be said that the entire recovery could be 
followed into the participant’s hands and be identified?  Or is such a case more 
similar to the case of Jeanette Knudson, whose recovery was deposited in a 
Special Needs Trust and, thus, was not in her hands for the purposes of an 
equitable remedy?220 
Equitable considerations surrounding the ERISA agreement.  Typically, a 
party can defend against a contract that is unconscionable, oppressive, or 
iniquitous. A contract may be treated as unconscionable when it is 
improvedent, oppressive, or totally one-sided.221  Even where there is no actual 
fraud, courts of equity will relieve against hard and unconscionable contracts 
which have been procured by taking advantage of the condition, 
circumstances, or necessity of the other parties.222  Factors relevant to finding a 
contract unconscionable include gross disparity in the values exchanged or 
gross inequality of the bargaining positions of parties, together with terms 
unreasonably favorable to the stronger party.223  Courts will also look to such 
factors as the age and education of the contracting parties, their commercial 
experience, and whether the aggrieved party had a meaningful choice when 
faced with unreasonably unfavorable terms.224 
In ERISA actions, courts should consider the equitable defense of 
unconscionability.  When a third party is not held liable for a member’s 
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injuries, the ERISA insurer would be required to cover all of the member’s 
medical costs under the terms of the health benefit plan.  If a member decided 
not to attempt recovery against a third party for causing the injuries, the 
ERISA plan’s only recourse would be to assert its subrogation rights and file 
the claim on behalf of the member at its own expense and risk.  In both cases, 
the ERISA plan would receive less than the full portion of the recovery.  
However, when a member does take steps to financially recover for injuries 
caused by a third party, any contract requiring an ERISA plan to retain all of 
the benefit of the action by claiming reimbursement of the full recovery, with 
no responsibility for the costs of procuring the recovery, is unconscionable.  
Clearly, no member would agree in advance to take such measures on behalf of 
the ERISA plan.  Imagine if the injured member was given the following 
options: (1) do nothing and your medical expenses are covered fully; (2) do 
nothing, allow the ERISA plan sue on your behalf and bear its own litigation 
costs, and your medical expenses will remain covered fully; or (3) spend time 
and expend effort, hire your own attorney, collect a statutorily capped recovery 
to reimburse the ERISA plan, and the result will be that you owe all of the 
litigation fees and costs or will have your health insurance benefits cut off.  
Members do not realize that these are their options. 
In today’s climate of rising health care costs and difficulty procuring health 
insurance, membership in an ERISA plan—probably the only option for 
medical care coverage offered by the employer—is likely an employee’s only 
choice for affordable health coverage.  Because of the gross inequality of the 
bargaining positions of the parties, together with terms unreasonably favorable 
to the stronger party, no court awarding appropriate equitable relief should find 
such a result conscionable, appropriate, or in line with public policy. 
Equitable considerations surrounding the unjust enrichment of the plan in 
cases of limited recovery.  Unjust enrichment is the receipt of an economic 
benefit under circumstances such that its retention without payment would 
result in the unjust enrichment of one party at the expense of the other.225  An 
argument exists that there has been unjust enrichment by both parties to an 
ERISA plan.  The plan can certainly make the argument that the participant 
who retains any portion of a limited or insufficient tort recovery after the plan 
has advanced medical benefits pursuant to a valid subrogation or 
reimbursement provision has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the plan.  
However, a participant who has independently hired an attorney at his own 
expense and received an insufficient settlement allocated to cover a portion of 
his damages can certainly make the argument that allowing the plan to receive 
all of those funds without consideration for appropriate allocation of the 
expenses and fees incurred in obtaining the funds has unjustly enriched itself at 
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the expense of the participant.  Courts should attempt to resolve this issue by 
allowing for partial reimbursement to ERISA plans in the case of a members’ 
capped or limited recovery. 
Equitable considerations surrounding the imposition of a constructive trust 
or lien on a fund that is in the participant’s hands.  A constructive trust is a 
restitutionary remedy used by a court of equity to compensate a party who 
unfairly holds a property interest to convey that interest to another whom it 
justly belongs.226  It is not a remedy for recovery or compensation under any 
theory of contract law or tort but rather a restitutionary remedy that arises by 
operation of law and is imposed by a court on equitable and public policy 
grounds when a person holding money or property would profit by a wrong or 
be unjustly enriched at the expense of another if he were permitted to retain 
it.227  If a constructive trust or lien becomes available when an injured party 
comes into possession of a fund for recovery, it is important to note that the 
fund is usually held in the possession of his attorneys who also have a lien 
imposed on the fund for an amount equal to their attorney’s fees and costs.228  
Usually, an injured party only receives that portion of the fund that has already 
been reduced by attorney’s fees and costs.  Because the participant only ever 
sees that portion, it is inequitable to allow the plan to claim reimbursement of 
the entire amount according to the plan provisions.  This seems at odds even 
with the familiar rule of equity espoused by the Supreme Court in Sereboff. 
Because Section 502(a)(3) prescribes that the civil enforcement of ERISA 
plan terms by a fiduciary must be for “appropriate equitable relief,” it is only 
logical that the judiciary allow participants to bring equitable defenses to plan 
terms, acknowledging fully the import of the words of the statute and 
employing all historical principles of equity, fairness, and justice. 
VII.  A CALL FOR A CHANGED JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF “APPROPRIATE 
EQUITABLE RELIEF” 
The judiciary needs to strike the appropriate balance between ERISA core 
policy objectives and the objectives of states in enacting statutory caps on 
recovery by applying Section 502(a)(3) as written, giving full meaning to the 
words “appropriate equitable relief.”229  As the introductory case illustrates, 
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each party can benefit when a capped recovery is allocated appropriately and 
equitably among the interested parties.  In that case, because there were not 
enough funds recovered to satisfy obligations, the state court adjudicated the 
matter and held that the injured party should receive approximately one-third 
of the recovery for losses such as pain and suffering, lost wages, disability, and 
out-of-pocket medical expenses, including co-pays and prescription payments, 
also considering remaining outstanding medical bills that were not paid by the 
ERISA plan.230  The attorney was found to be entitled to full payment of his 
fees and the costs of litigation, split on a pro rata basis between the member 
and the plan and paid by the two parties receiving a benefit from the fund he 
successfully created.231  Finally, the plan received the remaining one-third of 
the settlement fund with its contribution for attorneys’ fees and costs of 
litigation.232  Such an outcome is both appropriate and equitable and should 
have been enforced by the federal court. 
When a court adjudicates the allocation of a partial or capped recovery in 
an equitable and appropriate manner, it advances the interests of all parties 
involved as well as the interests of society.  First, with regard to the interests of 
the ERISA plan, the three core objectives of ERISA would be met.233  The 
benefit protection policy would be served by providing an incentive for injured 
members and their attorneys to seek even a risky partial or capped recovery 
from the third parties that caused the injuries by ensuring the receipt of an 
equtibale portion of the recovery.  The cost minimization policy would be met 
because an appropriate equitable remedy would reduce litigation fees incurred 
by the plan by distributing the litigation costs against third parties between it 
and the member, thus creating an incentive for the member to take action and 
the attorney to assume the risk of pursuing the cause of action by taking the 
case for a contingency fee.  Additionally, ERISA plans would find that such an 
equitable distribution would result in it receiving a portion of the recovery 
 
obtain any reimbursement according to the plan provisions in an action where there were clearly 
enough funds and no applicable damage caps or statutory limiations. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., 
Inc. v. Sereboff, 407 F.3d 212, 214–15 (4th Cir. 2005) (The Sereboffs refused to pay any portion 
of their $750,000 tort recovery to reimburse the plan for the medical expenses paid by MAMSI 
on their behalf in the amount of $75,000.). 
Although not directly addressed in Sereboff, at least one court has held that it is not a violation of 
ERISA for a plan to withhold health benefits to a plan participant after the participant has refused 
to sign an early agreement to reimburse the fund.  Alves v. Silverado Foods, Inc., 6 Fed. Appx. 
694, 705 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 230. See Brunkhorst, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38107, at *7 (The injured member was paid 
$5,365.79, which approximately represented one-third of the net recovery, minus his pro rata 
share of attorneys’ fees and costs.). 
 231. Id. (The attorney was paid $9,151.31, representing “fees and expenses.”). 
 232. Id. (The plan was paid $6,282.90, which represented one-third of the net recovery, minus 
the plan’s pro rata share of attorneys’ fees and costs.). 
 233. Medill, supra note 17, at 919. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] ERISA—ON THE EDGE OF EQUITY 555 
without having to litigate against its members to protect the fund’s 
reimbursement rights.  Finally, the settlor function policy would be served in 
that, while the employer would still retain the benefits of customizing the 
plan’s package of benefits to the employer’s workforce and budget, it would 
preclude workers being subject to unconscionable plan provisions that result in 
unjust enrichment and ultimately lead to unsatisfied, financially-disadvantaged 
employees. 
Second, attorneys who litigate against tortfeasors would benefit from a 
court adjudication that allocates a partial or capped recovery in an equitable 
and appropriate manner.  Most attorneys agree to represent injured parties on a 
contingency basis.234  This is beneficial to both attorneys and injured parties 
who seek to redress injuries because it ensures that, when there is a recovery, 
both the client and the attorney recover an appropriate percentage, making the 
venture economically feasible.235  The attorney assumes the risk of the claim 
only when there is a likelihood of reward.  In cases of capped recovery, there is 
less incentive for attorneys to take the cases on a contingency basis because 
there is a statutory ceiling on the outcome of the case.  The attorney’s incentive 
is reduced further in cases where liability is difficult to prove because the 
likelihood of a recovery profiting both attorney and client is even less 
probable.236  Finally, if an ERISA plan seeks reimbursement of the entire 
recovery, leaving the attorney to recover his contingency fee from a 
disgruntled client who has received no portion of the funds, the attorney’s 
incentive to assume the risk in this type of litigation is seriously diminished. 
In the introductory case, while the attorney received payment from the 
initial settlement recovery, he was left with a client owing his entire recovery 
back to the ERISA plan and having his health insurance terminated so that the 
ERISA plan could recover the fee the client had already paid to the attorney.237  
In such a case, personal injury attorneys would be wise not to pursue any claim 
where there is a statutorily capped recovery and medical expenses have been 
paid by an ERISA plan that requires full reimbursement without any 
appropriate, equitable allocation.  However, if a judicial allocation split the 
recovery between the ERISA plan and the injured member, requiring each 
party to pay their pro rata share of attorney’s fees, the attorney can assure his 
client of modest recovery and ensure the ERISA plan that it will receive an 
equitable portion of the recovery at greatly reduced costs.  Should the judiciary 
interpret its enforcement of ERISA plans in this equitable manner, it will lead 
to negotiations of equitable distributions of capped recoveries between injured 
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workers, their attorneys, and the ERISA plan that will benefit all parties 
involved. 
While it is true that the ERISA plan might be able to obtain for itself the 
entire recovery, less attorneys’ fees and costs, by subrogating its members’ 
interest in their legal claims, the coordination and costs of such lawsuits would 
only result in meager financial benefit to the plan.  Initially, the plan would 
likely be required to coordinate with counsel in a variety of different 
jurisdictions on a significant number of diverse lawsuits, which would result in 
increased administration costs.  The ERISA plan would further be required to 
coordinate litigation between its retained counsel and the member.  Although 
the client is likely contractually bound by the plan terms to assist the pursuit of 
the claim, the client’s lack of interest in the outcome may result in less 
vigorous advocating of his claims.  Once the claim was resolved, the plan 
would still be required to pay its own attorneys’ fees and costs, plus the 
additional administrative costs of coordination of the litigation efforts, likely 
leaving it with less than the full reimbursement the plan requires of its 
members.  Therefore, while attorneys may be interested in pursuing such 
claims on behalf of ERISA plans asserting subrogation interests, an appropriate 
equitable allocation of capped recoveries creates more incentive for vigorous 
representation in an efficient manner by fostering an attorney-client 
relationship between the parties with the most incentive, leading to reduced 
costs of litigation and increased efficiency. 
Third, injured members would be benefited by court adjudication that 
allocated a partial or capped recovery in an equitable and appropriate manner.  
When members are injured by a tortfeasor, they have the most powerful 
interest in seeking justice for the harm caused to them.  By seeking out a local 
attorney who specializes in prosecuting their specific type of claim and 
attempting to maximize the recovery, the member serves the two primary goals 
of the tort system by seeking compensation for injuries and deterring future 
negligent behavior in both the defendant and others.238  Society has approved 
of injured persons hiring attorneys on a contingency fee basis to encourage the 
pursuit of personal injury lawsuits when it might not otherwise be financially 
feasible.239  To that end, it is important that injured members of society 
maintain an incentive to seek compensation and redress harms.  If this 
incentive is removed by ERISA plans that threaten members with no recovery 
and ultimately responsibility for attorneys’ fees and costs, in addition to the 
possible termination of their health benefits, it will discourage the pursuit of 
legitimate injury claims.  Such an outcome is not in the interests of the injured 
members of ERISA plans or society as a whole. 
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In conclusion, a call for judicial action is clear when ERISA plans 
requiring full reimbursement of an entire recovery intersect with injury 
recoveries that are limited or capped under state law.  In such a case, the 
judiciary should follow the plain language of Section 502(a)(3) and award 
appropriate equitable relief. By considering equitable defenses to 
unconscionable and unjust provisions in ERISA plans and giving full meaning 
to the modifier “appropriate” within the statue, the judiciary can meet the 
needs of society and each interested party to a capped or limited recovery.  It is 
recommended that the judiciary follow the pattern of the state court in the 
introductory case by allocating an appropriate portion of the recovery between 
the injured member, the attorney, and the ERISA plan, in line with the 
principles of equity.  The application of such an allocation would benefit all 
interested parties and society as a whole.  Should the judiciary fail to allow 
equitable defenses to strict application of ERISA plan terms and fail to apply 
the modifier “appropriate” to the equitable relief allowed in Section 502(a)(3), 
there will be a breakdown of the purposes of ERISA and the policies of the tort 
system, leaving injured workers who are members of an ERISA plan in debt 
for attorneys’ fees and costs or without health insurance.  The responsibility 
rests with the judiciary not to blindly follow the terms of the ERISA plan in the 
case of statutorily limited or capped recoveries, as illustrated in the 
introductory case, but to allow equitable defenses and give full meaning to the 
phrase “appropriate equitable relief.” 
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